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CASE COMMENT
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: EXCLUDING POLITICALCANDIDATES
FROM STATE-SPONSORED TELEVISED DEBATES
Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes,
118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998)
Timothy D. Aaron*
Respondent, a qualified' independent political candidate in Arkansas'
Third Congressional District, brought suit in a federal district court to
enjoin his exclusion from a state-sponsored2 televised political debate.3
Respondent alleged the exclusion infringed upon his First Amendment
rights.4 The district court, concluding the debate was a non-public forum,
dismissed Respondent's First Amendment claim because Respondent
failed to show that that exclusion was based on his particular viewpoint.5
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding the First
Amendment prohibited respondent's exclusion because the televised
debate was a limited public forum.6 The United States Supreme Court
* This Case Comment is dedicated to my wonderful family.
1. Respondent was qualified because he had obtained the 2,000 signatures required to
appear on the ballot for the seat. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct.
1633, 1638 (1998).
2. Petitioner, Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC), qualified as a state
agency, owning and operating the Arkansas Educational Television Network. See id. at 1637.
3. See id. at 1638. The debate aired on public television and, due to time constraints, was
limited to participation by the major party candidates and any other candidate who had strong
popular support in Arkansas's Third Congressional District. See id. at 1637. Petitioner excluded
Respondent because he lacked the requisite popular support. See id. at 1644. Specifically, he was
excluded because the voters did not consider him a serious candidate, the media did not consider
him a serious candidate, his campaign had little financial support, and he had no campaign
headquarters. See id. at 1643-44.
4. See id. at 1638. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress ofgrievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Respondent also
brought a claim under 47 U.S.C. § 315, which affords political candidates a limited right of access
to television airtime. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. The district court dismissed this claim and it
was not an issue in the instant case. See id.
5. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. Restricting access to a non-public forum is permissible
if reasonable and not based on opposition to the speaker's view. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). The Forbes jury found that political pressure
or disagreement with Respondent's views had not influenced the decision to exclude. See Forbes,
118 S. Ct. at 1638. Therefore, Respondent's First Amendment rights were not violated. See id.
6. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497,504-05 (8th Cir. 1996).
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the debate was a limited public forum because it was open to all
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reversed the Eighth Circuit and HELD, the debate was a non-public forum
and Respondent's First Amendment rights were not violated because the
exclusion was based on Respondent's status rather than his viewpoint.7
The Supreme Court has long held that the "First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by
the government."8 When speakers9 are excluded from participation in an
expressive activity taking place on public property, the Supreme Court has
utilized a forum analysis to determine whether the speaker has a First
Amendment right of access to the property.10 The Court first determines
whether the forum is public or non-public by evaluating the character and
nature of the property in question." The existence of a right of access to
access to the property
the property and the limitations for restricting
2
depend on the type of forum involved.1
In 1983, the Supreme Court set forth the characteristics and boundaries
of the forum analysis in PerryEducationAss'n v. PerryLocal Educators'
Ass'n. 3 In Perry, a union received exclusive access to a public school
district's internal mail system.' 4 A rival union challenged their exclusion
as a violation of their First Amendment rights. 5
The Supreme Court used a forum analysis to determine the
constitutionality of the exclusive access policy. 6 The Court recognized
three types of forums, each having different rights of access. 7 First, the
Court referred to places that have long been open to the public for the
purposes of assembly and debate as traditional public forums. 8 The Court
candidates running for the Third Congressional District. See id. at 504. Speakers cannot be
excluded from a limited public forum without a compelling governmental interest. See Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Respondent's exclusion due to a lack of
political viability, or popular support, was not sufficiently compelling or narrowly tailored to
survive First Amendment scrutiny. See Forbes,93 F.3d at 504-05.
7. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
8. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129

(1981).
9. The term "speakers" as used here refers to any persons expressing themselves by any
means of communication and is not limited to oral speaking.
10: See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,44 (1983).
11. See id. at 44-46.
12. See id. at 44.
13. See id. at 45-46.
14. See id. at 39-40. The exclusive access applied only to mailboxes and the mail system. See
id. at 41. The policy did not include exclusive access to other means of communication at the
schools. See id.Exclusive access to mailboxes and the mail system was afforded to Perry Education
Association after the union was elected and certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for
the Perry Township teachers. See id. at 40.
15. Seeid. at41.
16. See id. at 45-46.
17. See id. at 44-46.
18. See id. at 45. Places that are devoted to assembly and debate "by long tradition or by
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then described a second type of forum called a limited, or designated,
public forum.19 A limited public forum is one that allows speakers general
access simply by government designation.20 Restrictions on access to
traditional or limited public forums2" are subject to strict scrutiny.' Lastly,
the Court classified public property that was not a traditional or limited
public forum as a non-public forum.23 Non-public forums are not bound by
the strict First Amendment scrutiny that public forums receive. Nonpublic restriction is reasonable z and not premised on opposition to the
speaker's views.26 The Court held that the school's internal mail system
was a non-public forum because it was not open to the general public,27
and concluded that the restrictions placed on access were reasonable2 ' and
viewpoint-neutral.29 Therefore, the exclusion of the rival union was
permissible under the First Amendment.30
The Court further explained the differences between limited public
forums and non-public forums in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund." In Cornelius, legal defense funds and political
advocacy organizations were excluded from participation in a charity drive
aimed at federal employees.32 These organizations claimed the exclusion

government fiat" are traditional public forums. Id. For example, streets and public parks are
traditional public forums. See id.
19. See id. Public property opened and designated by the government "for use by the public
as a place for expressive activity" is a limited public forum. Id.
20. See id. at 45. A property can be a designated public forum even if the government did not
create the forum. See id.
21. As long as property is designated as a public forum by the government, the property is
subject to the same standards concerning exclusion that apply to traditional public forums. See id.
at 46.
22. See id. at 45-46. Content-based exclusions from public forums must be narrowly tailored
and "necessary to serve a compelling state interest." Id. at 45.
23. See id. at 46.
24. See id.
25. A restriction on speech in a non-public forum is reasonable if it is "consistent with the
[government's] legitimate interest in 'preserv[ing] the property ...for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."' Id. at 50-51 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
26. See id. at 46.
27. See id. at 46-47. The school district did not open the mail system, by policy or practice,
for general public access. See id. at 47.
28. See id. at 50. The exclusion was reasonable because it enabled the union to perform its
official duties as the exclusive representative of all teachers in the district. See id. at 51.
29. See id. at 49. The Court explains that the exclusion was based on the rival union's status,
rather than its particular views. See id.
30. See id. at 55.
31. 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
32. See id. at 790. The charity drive is referred to as the Combined Federal Campaign. See
id. In the workplace, volunteer federal employees conduct this charity drive. See id. The
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violated their First Amendment rights,33 arguing that the charity drive was
a limited public forum.34
The Court analyzed the charity drive using the Perry public forum
framework.3" Clarifying the differences between the three forums, the
Court stated that a limited public forum is created "only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."36 The key issue for
the Court was whether the government intended to designate the property
as public.37 After reviewing the policy and practice of admitting
organizations to participate in the drive, the Court concluded that the
government did not intend to open the charity drive to the public.3"
Therefore, it classified the drive as a non-public forum.39 In addition, the
Court concluded that the exclusion satisfied the requisite reasonableness
and that the justifications for exclusion were "facially neutral
standard,' 41
and valid.
In InternationalSocietyfor Krishna Consciousnessv. Lee,42 the Court
recently expanded on the requirement that exclusions from a non-public
forum be reasonable.43 In that case, a nonprofit religious organization was

restricted from soliciting contributions at public airport terminals in New
York. 44 The issue was whether enforcing the restrictions violated the

organization's First Amendment rights.4' The Court once again utilized a
forum-based approach to assess the restrictions.' The Court stated that

respondents were excluded because they did not further the drive's purpose of providing traditional
health and welfare agencies a means to solicit contributions in the federal workplace. See id. at 807.
33. See id. at 795.
34. See id. at 804. The respondents argued that the charity drive was open for use by all
charitable organizations. See id.
35. See id. at 800-06.
36. Id. at 802.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 804. The charity drive had a policy of admitting only "appropriate" agencies.
Id. Further, the management of the charity drive had developed "extensive admission criteria to
limit access to the Campaign." Id. This policy was implemented in the selection process by
requiring organizations to obtain permission to participate from the charity drive officials. See id.
39. See id. at 805. The Court noted that limiting access is not dispositive to forum
classification. See id. However, it does suggest that the government did not intend to create a
forum for expressive activity. See id.
40. See id. at 809.
41. Id. at 812. The Court noted that regulations limiting access to a non-public forum do not
need to be precise. See id. The Court declined to decide whether the exclusion was motivated by
a bias against the excluded group's viewpoint because the issue was not fully briefed before the
Court. See id.
42. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
43. See id. at 683-85.
44. See id. at 676. Solicitation was only restricted within the terminals themselves. See id.
45. See id. at 674.
46. See id. at 678-81.
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airport terminals could not be classified as traditional public forums
because they historically have not been opened for expressive activity.47
Finding a lack of intent by the operators to open the airport for expressive
purposes, the Court concluded that the airport terminals were non-public
forums.4" The Court continued by explaining the reasonableness of the
restrictions on solicitation.4 9 It explained that if the group was allowed to
freely solicit in the airport terminals, it might have a disruptive effect on
the purpose of the airport."0 In addition, the Court explained that the
monitoring and crowd control duties of the State might be significantly
increased if the respondent was allowed to solicit.51 In light of the
foregoing policy considerations, the Court upheld the restrictions on
solicitation in the airport terminals.5 2
In the instant case, the Court expanded the category of non-public
forums to include televised public political debates.53 The Court again
based its decision on the forum analysis used in Perry and Cornelius.54 In
making its decision, the Court reviewed the forum's access policy and the
consequences of forbidding exclusion in light of the intended purposes of
the debate. 5 After completing this thorough analysis, the Court held that
the debate was a non-public forum. 6
The Court began by analyzing the type of forum.57 Specifically, the
issue was whether the televised debate was a designated public forum or
a non-public forum. 8 The Court determined that Petitioners did not intend
to make the debate generally available to a class of speakers.5 9 Absent this
intent of general access, government property is not considered to be a
public forum.' In the instant case, the government merely allowed

47. See id. at 680.
48. See id. at 679-80.
49. See id. at 683.
50. See id. at 683-84. By impeding the flow of traffic, the solicitors could create disruption.
See id. at 684. In turn, this may cause delays and inconvenience. See id. Although these problems
may be insignificant as a result of allowing a single group to solicit, the Court found that
justifications for restrictions should be measured by the potential impact of allowing all groups to
solicit. See id. at 685.

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998).
54. See id. at 1641.
55. See id. at 1642-43.
56. See id. at 1642.
57. See id. at 1641.
58. See id. at 1642. Both parties agreed that the televised debate was not a traditional public
forum. See id. at 1641.
59. See id. at 1642.

60. See id.
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selective access for individual speakers.61 Although eligibility for access
to the debate was open to all candidates, each had to individually obtain
permission to participate in the debate. 62 The government's practice of
candidate-by-candidate selective access led the Court to conclude that it
did not intend to designate the debate as a public forum. 63 Therefore, the

Court held that the debate was a non-public forum." The Court justified its
decision by explaining that deeming such a debate a public forum could
ultimately lead to a reduction, rather than a promotion, of speech.65
Classifying the debate as a non-public forum did not complete the
instant Court's First Amendment analysis. 66 The Court proceeded to
determine whether the exclusion was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.67
It concluded that the respondent's exclusion was due to his status as an
unpopular candidate.6" Exclusions resulting from a speaker's status, as
opposed to those relating to a speaker's viewpoint, are permissible in non-

public forums. 69 Therefore, the Court found that the exclusion was
viewpoint neutral,7' and held that the respondent's First Amendment rights
were not violated.71

In the instant case, the majority stated that a limited public forum is
created only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for use

by the general public.72 However, the Court failed to find the intent
necessary to create a public forum.73 It found that the television station

61. See id. at 1642-43.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1643.
65. See id. After determining the debate was a non-public forum, the Court justified its
decision on policy grounds by exploring the consequences of allowing general access. See id. The
Court stated that to include all of the candidates on the ballot in the debate would undermine the
purpose of the debate. See id. With a limited amount of time to air the candidates' views, the station
had to either exclude some candidates or spread the time evenly over a possibly infinite number of

qualified candidates. See id. at 1637,1643. The Court explained that given these two options, some
stations may choose to cancel the debate, therefore reducing the amount of speech allowed. See id.
at 1643.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1644.
69. See id.
70. See id. However, the dissent argues that the lack of objective criteria for exclusion gives
the AETC limitless discretion to exclude candidates. See id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent states that the lack of exclusion criteria allowed AETC to make "ad hoc judgements about
the dimensions of its forum." Id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent would
require objective standards in an effort to reduce the possibility of viewpoint-based exclusions. See
id. at 1649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 1644.
72. See id. at 1641.
73. See id. at 1642-43.
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made candidate-by-candidate determinations of who would participate in
the debate.7 4 Similarly, in Cornelius, determinations of participation in a
charity drive were made on an agency-by-agency basis.' Following its
decision in Cornelius,the instant court held that the use of selective access
refuted the contention that the debate was opened to a class of speakers.76
Instead, the instant Court found that access was reserved for a specified
class of speakers.' Members of this class then had to receive individual
7
permission to participate in the debate.7
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the instant Court's reasoning.79
In the instant case, the debate was open to all viable candidates. 80
Therefore, Justice Stevens stated that the debate could have been
considered a limited public forum open to the class of all viable
candidates.81 The problem with this argument is that it departs from the
Court's prior decisions. 2 Following Justice Stevens' s reasoning, the school
mail system addressed in Perry would have been considered a limited
public forum open to all parties that obtained permission from the school
district to have access to the internal mail system. Justice Stevens's forum
analysis would transform almost all non-public forums into limited public
forums. However, the Court in Perry found that "[t]his type of selective
access [did] not transform government property into a public forum."8 3 In
the instant case, the Court found that the distinction between general access
and selective access furthers First Amendment interests. 84 Specifically, the
instant Court noted that if this distinction was not recognized, the
government might choose to close the forum to all speakers thereby
avoiding any potential controversy. 5 Therefore, the instant Court
concluded that the debate, having selective access, was a non-public
forum. 6
As the Court stated in Cornelius,restrictions on access to a non-public
forum must be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the property's

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id.
See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 805.
See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1642-43.
See id.
See id. at 1642.
See id. at 1649 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1637.
See id. at 1649 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

82. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 804-05.
83. Perry,460 U.S. at 47.
84. See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1642.
85. See id. at 1643. In fact, as a result of the lower court's decision in this case, the Nebraska
Educational Television Network cancelled a scheduled United States Senate debate. See id.
86. See id.
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intended purpose. 7 The instant Court found that the exclusion of
Respondent was a result of his status as a non-viable candidate. 8 Under
Perry, exclusion based on one's status rather than their viewpoint is
permissible.8 9
One potential problem not addressed by the instant majority is that the
exclusion may have concealed a bias towards the speaker or his viewpoint.
Justice Stevens addressed this problem in his dissent, arguing that the
television station should have had more objective criteria for excluding
candidates.' ° While noting a viable concern, unfortunately the caselaw
relied on by Justice Stevens sets standards inapplicable to the forum in the
instant case. His argument is supported by previous cases requiring
objective, definite standards in limited public forums.9' However, by
definition, limited public forums and non-public forums are governed by
different standards. 2 In Cornelius, the Court stated that limited public
forum exclusions must be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest.93 However, exclusion from a non-public forum need only be
viewpoint-neutral.94 Therefore, the narrow standards that Justice Stevens
would require are necessary only in limited public forums and are not
necessary to show mere viewpoint neutrality.
A viewpoint-neutral exclusion also must be reasonable.95 In Krishna,
the restrictions were reasonable because of the potential disruptive effect
of allowing general access." Similarly, the instant Court relied on the
potential disruption to find the exclusion reasonable.' It stated that if
general access were granted to all candidates, then the television station
would have serious problems with the time constraints.9 s Problems such as
these support the instant Court's finding that the exclusion was
reasonable. 99
The Court's decision in the instant case will certainly have an impact
on future political debates. Independent candidates seeking media coverage
87. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 800.
88. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
89. See Perry,460 U.S. at 49.
90. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (holding
that a public forum must have articulated standards when exercising discretion in setting a parade
ordinance fee); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147,150-51 (1969) (requiring narrow,
objective and definite standards when issuing a permit to participate in a parade).
92. See Perry,460 U.S. at 45-46.
93. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 800.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Krishna, 505 U.S. at 685.
97. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998).
98. See id.
99. See id.
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have lost a significant opportunity to debate issues with their fellow
candidates. Further, independent candidates lose a valuable opportunity to
generate public support for their platform and candidacy. Therefore, the
same non-viable candidate status that justified exclusion of the
independent candidate will be magnified by the exclusion itself. In
addition, it can be inferred from the Court's decision that if permission is
required to access government property that is not a traditional public
forum, then the Court will categorize that property as a non-public forum.
This narrows the scope of the limited public forum, seemingly reducing the
speakers' First Amendment rights. However, according to the Court, the
decision actually furthers First Amendment rights. " The instant Court was
faced with the decision of propelling an independent candidate's status as
a non-viable candidate or following its longstanding public forum analysis
and furthering First Amendment interests. The Court chose to follow
precedent
and held that the televised political debate was a non-public
10
forum.

100. See id. at 1642.
101. See id. at 1643.
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